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Abstract
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) seek political influence through the
provision of information directed towards political representatives. In addi-
tion, NGOs also frequently apply means of political pressure, for instance
through exposure of the issues at stake in the media. To understand how
NGOs obtain impact on political decisions, one must analyze the mechanisms
that makes it rational for the politician to comply to these less formal polit-
ical activities. With the use of tools and concepts from economic theory, I
provide an explanation of why and how NGOs have political influence.
This thesis develops a model that provides several predictions regarding
these questions. Large policy responses are likely to be observed on complex
issues of significant public interest. If the conflict of interest between the
incumbent and the NGO under these circumstances is large, the NGO can
start an informational cascade via the media, which consequently put pres-
sure on the incumbent to change its policy. We do not however expect to
see much impact on policy from NGOs in situations where we have a non-
complex issue of large public interest. In this situation the incumbent will
emphasize the median voter, at the same time as there is no scope for the
NGO to start an informational cascade.
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The model also gives predictions related to the distribution of resources
between competing NGOs’. Given a situation where the issue is of little
public interest, the model’s prediction is in line with the conventional theory,
that the NGO with the most resources will gain policy influence. However,
in situations where the specific issue is complex and of large or moderate
public interest, the distribution of resources between the NGOs will be of
little relevance for the final policy. In fact, the model predicts that a poor
NGO can win the competition over policy if its interest of conflict with the
incumbent is sufficiently strong. Although the economic model made for this
thesis produce interesting results, it is to consider as a crude understanding
of reality, primarily intended as a point of departure for further economic
research on the subject.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) seek political influence through the
provision of information directed towards political representatives. In addi-
tion, NGOs also frequently apply means of political pressure, for instance
through exposure of the issues at stake in the media1. To understand how
NGOs obtain impact on political decisions, one must analyze the mechanisms
that makes it rational for the politician to comply to these less formal polit-
ical activities. Over the last decades a growing number of NGOs have given
the organized civil population an increased local, national and international
recognition, and hence political influence. Driven by falling costs of com-
munication the number of NGOs has increased more than the tenfold since
1970 [21]. In a 1995 UN report on global governance the estimated number
of international NGOs (INGOs) were 29,000 [26], while in 1969 there existed
somewhere between 2500 and 3000 such organizations [28]. The number of
1Political pressure is here a collective term for campaigns such as public demonstrations,
strikes, sit-ins, sabotages or critical chronicles. In the political economy literature political
pressure often refers to financial campaign contributions from special interest groups.
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national NGOs is significantly higher2. The increased influence of the orga-
nized civil society has come with the cost of a more complex and opaque po-
litical decision process. Although there are few systematic empirical studies
of NGOs’ influence on public policies, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence to
support the role of NGOs as agenda setters and influential political players3.
I will briefly give two examples of such anecdotal evidence. The first is
the international ’anti-globalization’ movement which gained strength during
the late 1990’s. To most people the movement became known after the WTO
summit in Seattle the fall of 1999 which was overshadowed by massive street
demonstrations. The demonstrations were mainly organized by national and
international NGOs concerned with labor issues, the environment and con-
sumer protection. Succeeding events such as the World Bank meeting the fall
2000 in Prague and the G8 summits in Gothenburg and Genoa the summer of
2001 experienced similar demonstrations and public riots. The NGOs’ pres-
sure against globalization and trade liberalization gained tremendous media
attention which raised the public awareness on the issue. The media cover-
age was mainly related to the authorities’ abuse of activists which eventually
led to a proliferation of scepticism toward globalization in the population.
Globalization is a complex issue that has more dimensions to it than any
private individual can make an overall reasonable assessment of. Complex
issues are rarely subject to strong debate during an election campaign. Con-
sequently, the political process behind such issues is more detached from
2The same 1995 UN report prepared for the World Conference on Global Governance
(1998) reported an estimation of 2 million NGOs in both the US and in India, while in
Russia there were only 4000.
3Examples of public policies could be the level of regulation, allocation and level of
public finance or trade policy.
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the election process. Decisions are made with less attention to the voter
perspective and more attention to information provision and lobbying. Yet,
when NGOs succeed in achieving media attention, like the anti-globalization
movement did, there is a large scope for winning the sympathy of the public,
partly driven by an informational cascade mechanism. In addition to news
coverage in the conventional media such as newspaper, television and radio,
the anti-globalization movement also received considerable support from the
popular culture like rock-groups showing their sympathy with the movement
through lyrics, or popular authors writing books on the subject. All of this is
incorporated into the concept of media and the transmission of information,
and contributes to persuade the public and eventually politicians to comply
through democratic mechanisms. Whether the anti-globalization has had
any short term practical political impact on WTO negotiations or the World
Bank’s practices remains an open question. However, by raising the aware-
ness of the population on complex issues the NGOs are likely to eventually
gain some influence.
Another illustrating example is the emergence of environmentalist NGOs
and how they have contributed to put regulation of carbon dioxide emissions
on the international political agenda. In the aftermaths of the Kyoto protocol
where national quotas for carbon dioxide emissions were set, a pronounced
public debate emerged in Norway concerning whether one should build nat-
ural gas powerplants or not. Environmentalist NGOs were strictly against
the development of such energy plants and argued that gasworks would lead
to more power consumption and larger carbon emissions. The supporters
however claimed that the energy produced with the gas powerplants would
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replace more polluting sources of energy. Although some argue that the en-
vironmentalist NGOs have had less success than they should have had, it is
unquestionable that they have raised the public awareness on this issue and
hence the governmental regulation of emissions.
In this thesis I will not take any stand on whether NGOs’ increased in-
fluence on public policies has led to a pareto improvement or not. However,
by using tools and concepts from economic theory I will try to give an ex-
planation of why, how and which NGOs have political influence. In the pas-
sage that follows I will first discuss the motivation of governments before I
present a brief outline of the formal model presented in Chapter 3. There are
basically two traditions within political economy literature, resting on alter-
native determinants of the formation of policy. The first tradition assumes
that the politician has ideological preferences and is motivated by specific
policy outcomes. Politicians with such motives are referred to as partisan
politicians [27]. The second approach, which is the most commonly used in
political economy, takes as a point of departure that there are some rents of
holding public office and that the candidate will opportunistically decide on
whatever policy the majority of the people desires. In this thesis, I try to
synthesize the two traditions by assuming that the politician has preferences
beyond simply satisfying the preferences of the median voter. Specifically,
I assume that there are certain issues in the candidates’ party programmes
which are not extensively debated during the election campaign and for which
the candidate can set its own preferred policy without any significant effect
on the electoral outcome. A common characteristic of the issues that are not
brought up during a campaign is that they are highly complex. Downs (1957)
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argued that when private information is costly to obtain, it can be rational
for individual voters to stay uninformed since the costs exceeds the marginal
utility of being informed [12]. Hence, when issues are complex it is likely
that most voters are insufficiently informed to determine their own preferred
policy on the issue. Complex issues are therefore unfit as campaign issues
since the voters are incapable of deciding their preferred candidate based on
this issue.
The model I present in chapter 3 has two competing NGOs that lobby
the government for influence on the same issue. The NGOs, which differ
both in terms of preferences and access to resources, must choose between
informational lobbying or political pressure as means of influencing the final
policy outcome. Pressured by the two competing NGOs, the government
must decide on maintaining the party programme policy or implementing
an alternative policy, either motivated by convincing arguments presented
through informational lobbying or by the adjustment of the median voter’s
preferred policy spurred by political pressure through the media.
If there is no new information, or if the signals received from the respec-
tive NGOs cancel each other out, the incumbent will prefer to go through
with the policy stated in its party programme. The amount of informational
lobbying an NGO will perform depends on to which extent the incumbent em-
phasizes the policy outcome itself and the NGO’s resource budget constraint.
We assume that the incumbent’s conviction about the optimal policy can be
bought in the way that the more resources (e.g. financial) the NGO spends on
informational lobbying the more convinced is the incumbent that the NGO
is right. This way of modeling lobby activity is different from the lobbying
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through campaign contributions in Grossman and Helpmans famous paper
’Protection for sale’ (1994) [13]. In that model, the lobbyists transfer funds
directly to the candidate, which is more in accordance with American prac-
tices. Our approach is more in line with the European tradition of buying
arguments provided by lawyers and researchers to convince the politician4.
To illustrate, the informational lobbying game can be compared to a court
suit between two conflicting parties. The two competing NGOs can be inter-
preted as a plaintiff and a defendant and the government as judge. Similar
to a plaintiff and a defendant presenting evidence to promote their cause for
the judge, the two competing NGOs present evidence for the government. In
a law suit the party with most available resources to spend on lawyers will
have a relative advantage in providing the best evidence and hence increase
its chances of winning the law suit. The same is true for informational lobby-
ing. The wealthier NGOs will have an advantage in performing informational
lobbying independent of what the true state happens to be5. It is important
to notice that our model distinguishes itself from signalling games since there
is no assumption about any true state and therefore no asymmetric informa-
tion.
The alternative strategy to informational lobbying is political pressure.
In order to put credible pressure on the politician, the NGO needs public
attention. As described in Stro¨mberg (2002, 2004) the media is maximizing
profits and with its increasing returns to scale technology it is optimal to
get as many readers as possible6 [29][30]. Voters only have preferences over
4The model in Chapter 3 could easily be interpreted in the American tradition of
campaign contributions.
5Campaign contributions would in this example be interpreted as bribing the judge.
6Voters and customers are terms that address the same group of people from different
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policy outcomes that have a direct influence on their welfare and hence only
a demand for media coverage that provides information on these policies.
McCluskey and Swinnen (2004) present a rationale for what they refer to
as the ’bad news hypothesis’ [20]. It states that the media will have a clear
bias towards negative news due to the demand for such reports from their
readers7. Taking these theories into account the amount of policy coverage
by the media will be an increasing function of the policy’s deviation from
the median voter’s preferences8. There are three factors in our model that
determine whether an NGO will have success in using political pressure to
influence the incumbent’s policy decision. The first is that the issue must be
relevant for a large group of people. If not, there will be no demand for media
coverage on the issue, and hence, the media will not devote any attention
to the subject. The second is that the issue must be complex. Without
complexity there is no scope for NGO influence on the median voter through
the media since the voters have strong private signals regarding the issue.
Finally, the desired policy of the NGO must have a characteristic of ’bad
news’, which implies that the NGO’s preferred policy must be distant from
the incumbent’s stated party programme policy. The NGO with the strongest
conflict of interest with the incumbent’s preferred policy will therefore have a
comparative advantage in political pressure9. If all of these factors are present
the politician will bias its policy decision in favor of the NGO. The reasoning
perspectives.
7for a detailed explanation see section 2.5.2
8Since the audience is interested in bad news, and the media is interested in maximizing
interested readers, it follows that the media attention to a policy decision is larger the larger
the group of voters that considers the respective policy as bad news.
9This argument is line with the fact that political pressure often is referred to as ’protest
movements’.
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is that if the issue is of public interest, complex and has characteristics of ’bad
news’ the NGO can influence the desired policy of the median voter. Since
the incumbent has reelection motives the median voter’s preferred policy is
again important for the incumbent’s final policy decision. The median voter’s
preferred policy is in this case endogenously determined by the NGO’s public
signal through the media.
NGOs influence on politics is a new field of economic research that de-
serves further attention. Before I formally present my own theory in Chapter
3, I will devote the next chapter to a literature survey of selected theories
within the political economy and informational economics literature. The
theories presented in Chapter 2 are meant to serve as a theoretical basis for
arguing how NGOs’ role in politics can be compatible with economic the-
ory. The literature survey in Chapter 2 is by no means complete, but gives
a presentation of elements that I believe can contribute to the narrative of
how NGOs get political influence. Readers who are already familiar with the
literature can skip Chapter 2 and go directly to Chapter 3 where the model
is presented.
8
Chapter 2
NGOs’ political influence: a
literature survey
The theory chapter is divided into six sections. Apart from the ’private
politics’ literature -which addresses NGOs explicitly- there are few, if any,
economists that have dealt with NGOs role in democracies. However, there
do exist economic theories that easily can be related to and applied to ana-
lyze the political impact of NGOs. Section 2.1 and 2.2 deal respectively with
informational lobbying and political activism, which are two activities that
characterize the work of many advocacy NGOs, and hence relevant for this
thesis. Section 2.3 is a theory of asymmetric information between groups of
voters. The theory predicts that political representatives emphasize informed
voters in their policy decisions since informed voters are more responsive to
policy decision in their voting behavior. If members of NGOs are gener-
ally better informed than other citizens then this may be an explanation of
why NGOs have more political impact than they otherwise would have in a
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democracy. Section 2.4 address the Private politics literature which distin-
guish itself from the the rest of the theory chapter for two reasons. First of all
is it the only economic theory to my knowledge that address NGOs political
activities explicitly. The second reason is that private politics does not fo-
cus on asymmetric information, but takes as point of departure a bargaining
game between two conflicting parties. Section 2.5 is about the media and
its important role in society, transmitting information to the citizens. The
media is hence an important channel through which NGOs can get public
and political attention. Last but not least, section 2.6 presents the theory
of informational cascades. This theory is relevant, since it could provide an
explanation of NGOs’ political impact due their ability to influence voters’
preferred policy via a strong public signal about the optimal policy.
I consider the collection of theories presented in this chapter as an im-
portant basis for further theoretical work on NGOs political influence. My
model, which is presented in Chapter 3, implicitly incorporates the theory of
informational cascades and several characteristics of the media.
2.1 Informational lobbying
The formalized theory of informational lobbying, first introduced by Potters
and van Winden (1992), was originally intended to explain the interaction
between expert special interest groups and politicians [16]. However, Meyer’s
paper ’the political economy of NGO and information sharing’ (1997), states
that NGOs also have an important role as producers and providers of infor-
mation to decision makers. Furthermore she points out that the potential
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political role of NGOs has been increasingly important due to reduced costs
of communication and information transmission [21]. The economic litera-
ture on informational lobbying is therefore also highly relevant for modeling
NGOs’ influence on public policy.
NGOs accumulate knowledge and perform research on the issues that
they have preferences for. This information can be useful for uninformed
politicians who wants to make well informed decisions. However, since the
NGO has an incentive to bias the truth, not all signals from the NGO are
credible. The problem of the politician is then to distinguish ’cheap talk’ from
useful expertise information. This can be done by analyzing the incentive
structure of the NGO. If there are no incentives for the NGO to speak the
truth, then it reveals no information to the politician and has consequently
no influence on the politician’s decision. Such an situation is referred to as
a ’babbling equilibrium’ [14]. However, in situations where the NGO have
incentives to speak truthfully, there will be informational lobbying and the
NGO’s behavior will have impact on politics.
2.1.1 Informational lobbying with signalling
I want to illustrate the concept of ’informational lobbying with signalling’
by using Grossman and Helpman’s (2001) textbook model, based on Potter
and van Windens (1992) original contribution [14][16]. In the model there is
a single special interest group (SIG) which have the following preferences
U = −(p− θ − σ)2 − l (2.1)
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where p is the policy decided by the incumbent, θ describes the true state of
the world, σ is the policy bias of the SIG relative to the politician and l is
the exogenous cost of performing information lobbying for the SIG1. In this
setting the SIG is assumed to know the true state of the world which may
be either θH or θL, where θH > θL and where the lobbies preferred state is
always σ larger than the true state θ. The policymakers utility function is
G = −(p− θ)2 (2.2)
which implies that its desired policy is the true state, but it does not know
what it is. Since the SIG knows the true state, and the incumbent does not,
informational lobbying has a welfare enhancing potential. In this model the
SIG is said to be moderate since its preferred policy is dependent on the true
state θ2. This way there is some congruence in the interest of the SIG and the
policymaker, however, the politician must be aware of strategic manipulation
since the SIG prefers a higher value of the final policy p than the politician
does. The game proceeds as follows: first the SIG learns the true state, then
it decides whether to bear the cost l of preparing and presenting its case
to the policymaker. If the SIG decides to provide informational lobbying,
the policymaker will update its believes on θ based on the content of the
lobbying report and the fact that the SIG was willing to bear the cost l of
preparing a report. Since there are only two states of the world in this model,
θH and θL, the SIG only has incentives to misreport the truth when the true
1The exogenous lobbying costs can for example be interpreted as the fixed cost of hiring
a lawyer to write a letter to the legislator.
2Alternatively, like the model in Chapter 3, the NGOs have preferences independent of
any true state and can be called extremists
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state is θL. If the lobbyist always have incentives to report θH then lobbying
does not reveal any new information to the politician and the policymaker
will simply set the policy p = (θH + θL)/2
3. This is an example of the
aforementioned ’babbling equilibrium’, were the politician does not receive
any new information from the SIG that can update his beliefs. When the
bias of the NGO is small relative to the true state, σ small, then the potential
benefit of false reporting may be to small to justify the lobbying costs, and so
the SIG choose not to lobby when the true state is θL. When that is the case,
the policymaker will know that the true state is θH whenever it observes the
SIG lobby.
To construct such an equilibrium were the SIG lobby signal indicate that
the true state θH , we must investigate when the costs are such that the SIG
does not have the incentives to lobby when the state is θL, but does have
the incentive to lobby when the true state is θH . The SIG is willing to bear
the cost of lobbying in state θH if the utility of lobbying is greater than the
utility when not lobbying:
−(−σ)2 − l ≥ (θL − θH − σ)2 (2.3)
l ≤ (θH − θL)[2σ + θH − θL] ≡ k1
To have an equilibrium the SIG must also prefer to refrain from lobbying
3If no new information is revealed the politician simply assumes that there is an equal
probability for each of the two states to occur
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when the state is θL. This is satisfied as long as:
−(−σ)2 ≥ (θH − θL − σ)2 − l (2.4)
l ≥ (θH − θL)[2σ − (θH − θL)] ≡ k2
As we see from the inequalities k1 is larger than k2 which imply that there
exist a range of lobbying costs, l, where k1 > l > k2, such that both inequal-
ities 2.3 and 2.4 are fulfilled. If these criterions are satisfied there exists an
equilibrium where informational lobbying is completely truth revealing. This
type of informational lobbying is a typical signalling game. An important
notion is that the potential change in the incumbent’s behavior is not in-
duced by the content of the message itself, but rather the characteristics of
the interest group. This type of game where the politician is considered to
be a generalist and the NGO is a specialist distinguish itself from the model-
ing of informational lobbying used in Chapter 3. In that model there exists
no signalling of the true state, and so the effect of informational lobbying
is simple a matter of how much resources the NGO spends on lawyers and
researchers to support the NGO’s agenda. Although the treatment of infor-
mational lobbying in Chapter 3 is done somewhat more superficial than the
model just outlined here, the theoretical predictions that political influence
increase with the amount of money spend on informational lobbying and de-
crease with the conflict of interest between lobbyist and politician remain the
same.
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2.1.2 Informational lobbying in repeated games
Informational lobbying is more likely to occur in (infinitely) repeated games4.
In the real world NGOs and politicians meet repeatedly, and the NGO gains
from building up a reputation as truth-telling [11]. In order to keep its rep-
utation, the NGO does not have an incentive to deviate from truth-telling
since it would have long term negative consequences for its political influ-
ence. There are several examples of NGOs that have managed to build up
a credible reputation of truth-telling. An interesting example of reputation
building was done by ’Doctors Without Borders Norway’ who after receiving
overwhelming financial support in the aftermaths of the Tsunami, went to
the media and stated that they had received the financial help they needed
for this operation. At the same time as they encouraged people not to for-
get about other crises around the globe, the also signalled that they were a
responsible long term organization.
2.1.3 Verifiable reports
An alternative to the ”cheap talk” framework is to analyze informational
lobbying in terms of verifiable reports [11]. In these models, first introduced
by Milgrom (1981), the lobby can not lie about the true state to the legis-
lator, however it can choose to not lobby and withhold its information [22].
In a recent paper by Dahm and Porteiro (2006) they assume verifiable re-
ports and model a lobbying group that use both informational lobbying and
4To read more about repeated games see Watson (2002) [32].
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political pressure as means for achieving influence on legislators’ decisions5
[11]. To provide informational lobbying the SIG decides ex-ante whether to
buy a public or a private test. Both tests reveal the true state of nature with
probability x, gives no result with probability 1− x and can be bought at a
cost C(x). If the SIG choose the private test it can strategically choose to
withhold information in the case of an undesired result, while if it chooses a
public test there is no scope of withholding the test results. When the politi-
cian receive the test results from the SIG it updates its believes according
to Bayes’ rule and sets the policy according to these new believes. While
the ’cheap talk’ model only signalled the true state via the SIG’s decision to
invest in lobbying or not, the existence of verifiable reports makes also the
content of the report valuable to the legislator. Whether the SIG decides to
lobby or not within this framework depends on the cost of doing research as
well as the probability of finding the desired result.
2.2 Political activism as signalling
Lohmann (1993) provides a hypothesis to the puzzle why politicians some-
times respond to political action [18]. She argues that the political leader
has a policy rule that takes a cue of the size of the protest movement, and
if the number of activists exceeds a certain critical threshold the incumbent
will shift policy in favor of the activists.
The critical threshold for shifting policy is a function of the population’s
incentives to participate, which again is determined by environmental param-
5When Dahm and Porteiro talk about political pressure they refer to campaign contri-
butions. This is different from the interpretation of political pressure in this thesis.
16
eters affecting the benefits and costs of participation. Assume two countries,
country A and country B, which are identical in all respects, except that in
country A political activism is attended with the risk of exposure to policy
brutality. Since political activism is perceived to be more risky in coun-
try A there will consequently be fewer citizens that dear to demonstrate.
Lohmann’s theory is that even though the protest movement in country A
is smaller than in country B, the effect on policy will be the same. The
reason is that the incumbent will take the weaker incentives of country A to
perform activism into account when it sets its critical threshold for partici-
pation. This way the smaller protest movement in country A will gain the
same impact on policy as in country B6.
In Lohmann’s model the incumbent has no expert information, while all
individuals receive a private signal from their daily life about the true state
of the world. The private information from all individuals is assumed in ag-
gregate to give a correct understanding of the causality between policy and
outcome. The economy has a heterogenous population with four types of
voters: the activist moderates, the rationally apathetic moderates, the anti-
status-quo extremists and the pro-status-quo extremists. The anti-status-quo
extremist will always demonstrate regardless of their information about true
state, while the pro-status-quo extremist will never demonstrate. Since the
actions of the extremists are independent of their private information about
the true state, their actions reveal no information to the incumbent. How-
ever, among the group of activist moderates there are some individuals that
take costly political action in order to signal their private information to the
6What the incumbent in country A should do before anything else is to tell the police
to take it easy on the demonstrators. I will not pursue this debate here.
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leader, and influence her decision. These political actions give information
to the incumbent since they are state dependent. Some of the rationally-
apathetic moderates may also prefer a policy change given their private signal
about the true state, but for them the gain of changing policy is smaller than
the private cost of political action so they stay at home.
The incumbent has opportunistic preferences and in order to maximize its
chances of being reelected it wants to implement a policy that is beneficial to
the median voter, which is found in the group of moderates. In equilibrium
does the incumbent’s decision whether to change policy or not depend on
the number of activists, and the population’s incentives to demonstrate. The
fact that the activists’ preferences are not representative for the population
as a whole does however not bias the policy decision. This is because the
incumbent discounts the aggregate number of political actions by taking into
account that the anti-status-quo extremists always perform political actions.
In her model Lohmann does not try to explain why we from time to
time observe huge turnouts in public demonstrations, but rather why small
numbers can often make a ’big splash’. She recognizes two effects that may
give a small number of activist a decisive effect on policy. The first effect
originate from her paper on the Monday demonstrations in Leipzig before
the fall of the Berlin wall (1992), where she interpreted the demonstrations
as an ’informational cascade’ [17]. The idea of the informational cascade
is that since individual’s policy preferences are correlated, publication of
some individual’s negative experiences may affect other individuals’ policy
preferences. This informational cascade may in turn alter the decision of
a leader with reelection motives. The second reason why the size of the
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protest movement is not decisive for its impact on policy is, as mentioned
introductorily, that the critical number of actions depend on the populations’
incentives to participate. The relationship between turnout and impact is
determined by the incumbent’s ex-ante expected number of political actions
relative to the realized turnout. If the realized turnout is small in absolute
numbers, but larger than the incumbent’s ex-ante critical threshold value,
then the small group will provide a strong enough signal to the political
leader to shift policy.
The theme of informal ways of achieving impact on public policies in
Lohmann (1992,1993) is very similar to that of this thesis. Lohmann focuses
on direct linkages between demonstrators and political leaders, while I look
at processes also including NGOs and the media. Both, however, recognize
the significance of informational cascades in democracies which shift people’s
preferred policies. The theories are therefore compatible within the story of
interactions between NGOs, political activism, the media, voters and political
leaders.
2.3 Information asymmetries between groups
of voters
Lohmann (1998) predicts that special interest organizations may achieve
greater political influence than their proportion of the constituency corre-
sponds to [19]. She argues that members of special interest organizations are
better informed than the average voter, and will therefore be more responsive
to political maneuvers than the average less informed voter. Better informed
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voters have a more precise signal about the causality between politicians’
policies and its observed consequences, and are consequently more respon-
sive to political actions. Responsive means that they are more likely to use
their vote to punish or reward the politician for its performance in office.
The prediction that politicians disproportionately emphasize informed vot-
ers represented by the special interest organization is easily applied for voters
in support of an NGO. I will illustrate this with an example.
Let’s assume that there are two groups of voters of different size7. The
smallest one is organized in an NGO and supporter of the environment,
the larger one is unorganized and has strong preferences for low prices on
consumer goods. An NGO, compared to individual voters, has low costs of
accessing information on political decisions. The NGO’s low access cost com-
bined with the ability to transmission information cheaply to its members,
makes the voters in support of the NGO better informed than the voters
without an NGO working for their preferences8. The incumbent is aware of
the fact that if she increases environmental standards, most of the environ-
mental supporters will know that she has done a good job for their cause
and reward her with their vote. Increasing environmental standards leads
to increased production costs and more expensive consumer goods. Mem-
bers of the large group of voters will therefore experience increased consumer
prices as a consequence of the improved environmental standard. This group
however is less informed due to high individual costs of monitoring political
7The assumption of difference in group size is not necessary, but makes the example
more interesting.
8This difference is probably even larger between the groups of voters that are targeted
by the media and the groups of voters that are not targeted by the media. For a discussion
on this see section 2.5.
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decisions and therefore do most of them not infer that the increased price
level is the incumbent’s fault. Since the incumbent is not held responsible by
the large group, but rewarded by the smaller group supporting the NGO, the
politician achieves a net gain by biasing her policy toward the small group.
Although optimal for the politician, the outcome is socially inefficient since
the largest group of voters is neglected.
2.3.1 Asymmetric information in the probabilistic vot-
ing model
I will show that this situation can be modeled by reinterpreting the proba-
bilistic voting model described in Persson and Tabellini (2000), first intro-
duced by Hinich (1977)and Couglihn and Nitzan (1981) [15][10]. In our new
interpretation of the probabilistic voting model the size of the distribution
interval of the individual-specific parameter σiJ is dependent on the precision
of the information signal a group receives regarding economic policy. σiJ is
uniformly distributed on the interval
[
− 1
2φJ
,
1
2φJ
]
.
where i is the number of people in the economy and J signals whether the
individual belongs to the organized group (O), or the unorganized group (U).
A well informed group will have a higher value of φJ , which reduces their
ideological bias, and makes them more responsive to economic policy9.
9A higher value of φJ makes the interval smaller which increases the density of voters
for each value of σiJ .
21
The utility of a voter in group J is represented by the function
ωJ = cJ +H(e) (2.5)
Where H(·) is a concave and increasing function, e is the level of environ-
mental regulation, and cJ is the private consumption of group J. Private
consumption is given by
cJ = (1− τ) yJ (2.6)
where yJ is the income of group J, yU > yO and 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. An important
notion is that differing income levels across the two groups is what makes
the two groups, O and U , have different views on the importance of the en-
vironment relative to private consumption in this model10.The governmental
expenditure on environmental protection is
e = τy (2.7)
where y is average income level in the economy across the two groups. In-
serting equation 2.6 and 2.7 into equation 2.5 and maximizing with respect
to the tax level τ , we find the preferred level of environmental regulation for
group J
eJ = H−1e (
yJ
y
) (2.8)
As you can see from equation 2.8, the preferred environmental standard will
10This drive of the model is not an attempt to explain why some individuals are organized
and others are not. However if one assumes that the correlations between young and poor,
and old and rich are strong, this assumption may not be too far fetched since people
organized in environmentalist NGOs tend to be young of age.
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vary with the group’s income level, yJ . The high income group will optimally
prefer a lower provision of publicly financed environmental standard since
they pay more (in absolute terms) for the same regulation.
There are two political parties, A and B, which are identical and compete
for political power. Voter i in group J prefers party A if
W J (eA) > W
J (eB) + σ
iJ + δ
where eA and eB are the policy proposal of party A and B respectively,
while σiJ is an individual-specific parameter that measures voter i’s individual
ideological bias toward party B. σiJ can take on negative as well as positive
values. As stated before σiJ is uniformly distributed over the interval
[
− 1
2φJ
,
1
2φJ
]
since σij is uniformly distributed, φJ is the density. Both groups have mem-
bers with an inherent bias in either direction, however the larger the value of
φJ for the specific group, the smaller is this bias. Since the group in support
of the NGO receives more precise information signals about the causality
between policy and outcome they become more likely to reward policy favors
with a vote. This is exactly what the size of φJ tell us. The larger φJ is, the
smaller is the ideological bias and the more responsive the group is to slight
changes in policy decisions.
δ measures the aggregate uncertainty and tells us the inherent popular-
ity of a party B compared to party A in the population as a whole. The
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parameter δ is assumed uniformly distributed over the interval:
[
− 1
2ψ
,
1
2ψ
]
The timing in the model is as follows: (1) candidate A and B simultaneously
announce their electoral policy eA and eB. At this stage they know the
distribution of σiJ and δ, but not their realized values. (2) δ is realized and
all the uncertainty is resolved, (3) elections are held, and (4) the promoted
policy is implemented.
In order to solve this, we begin at stage (2) and identify the swing voter,
which is the voter indifferent between voting for party A and party B
σJ = W J (eA)−W J (eB)− δ.
All voters i in group J prefers party A as long as σiJ ≤ σJ . Party A’s share
of the voters can be expressed as
piA =
∑
J
αJprob
(
σiJ ≤ σJ) =∑
J
αJφJ
(
σJ +
1
2φJ
)
, (2.9)
where αJ is the size ratio of group J . The probability of winning the election
for party A is then
pA = prob
(
piA >
1
2
)
=
1
2
+
ψ
φ
[∑
J
αJφJ
(
W J (eA)−W J (eB)
)]
, (2.10)
where φ ≡∑J αJφJ is a constant. In equilibrium both parties face an iden-
tical maximization problem, and end up choosing the same policy eA = eB.
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It follows that the equilibrium swing voter is the individual with parameter
σJ = −δ. We find the equilibrium policy by maximizing the probability for
party A of winning the election with respect to the environmental policy, eA.
The f.o.c gives us
1
y
∑
Jα
JφJyJ =
∑
Jα
JφJHe (eA) (2.11)
The optimal policy is then
eA = H
−1
e
P JαJφJyJφ
y
 = H−1e
(∼
y
y
)
(2.12)
Where
∼
y = α
OφOyO
φ
+ α
UφUyU
φ
, which is a weighted average of the income
for the two groups. The weights are a product of group size and group
information, and imply that a small group of people can always compensate
by being equivalently more informed in order to achieve the same political
influence. From the model you can see that if the two groups were equally
informed then the environmental policy would be determined by the average
income voter.
The theory of asymmetries of information between voter groups can ex-
plain why it may be rational for a politician to disproportionately emphasize
the agenda of an NGO that only represent the preferences of a small part of
the constituency. Stro¨mberg (2002) argues analogously that informed voters
are more emphasized in public policy (see 2.5). However, instead of focusing
on whether groups are represented by a special interest organization or an
NGO, he argues that the asymmetries in information is due to the selection
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bias regarding which groups of citizens are the most profitable customers for
the media [30].
2.4 Private Politics
The private politics literature is one of the few contributions made by economists
on NGOs. Baron’s paper ’Private politics’ (2003) was the first to formalize
a theory on NGOs’ influence on corporate behavior [3].The most recent con-
tributions are done by Baron (2005) and Baron and Diermeier (2005) [5][4].
The term private politics refers to situations were conflicts are solved in a
bargaining game without relying on the law or governmental intervention.
Private politics is a particularly important tool for NGOs to regulate foreign
practices of multinational corporations. Multinational corporations have a
pattern of locating their manufacturing to poor countries with unorganized
labor unions. These economies are often dependent on capital from multi-
national companies, and in order to attract corporations they participate in
a race to the bottom with respect to labor laws and governmental regula-
tion. The repeated campaigns launched against the multinational cloth and
footwear producers Nike and Adidas is a typical example of private politics.
Both companies have experienced heavy criticism and falling demand for
their products as it became public knowledge that several of their products
were produced by children. The massive exposure to negative publicity and
the following boycott of their merchandizes eventually forced both companies
to upgrade their treatment of employees in Asia and to take responsibility of
the practices of their subcontractors.
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Baron first introduced the term private politics when he made a formal
theory on the interaction between activists (NGOs) and private firms. Pri-
vate politics is a theory of how NGOs use market mechanisms to force profit
maximizing firms’ into altering their practices. By initiating public boycotts
of specific brands and products, the NGO hits the firm where it hurts. Re-
duced demand leads to decreased profits which eventually force the firm to
take counter-action in order to maintain its shareholders demands for com-
petitive profits. Whether the firm choose to fight or comply to the demands
depends on the cost of altering its current practices and the credibility of the
NGO’s threat.
NGOs have limited resources and can only target a selected group of
firms at a time. This gives firms incentives to take proactive actions and
improve their practices in order to avoid being selected as targets of activist
campaigns. The recent emergence of social corporate responsibility programs
could be an example of firms’ proactive actions to avoid being targeted by
NGOs.
Baron and Diermeier (2005) argue that activists are increasingly turning
to private politics to advance their agenda [5]. They claim that this is partly
because of the absent success to influence politicians, and partly because
international corporations have become increasingly important in global eco-
nomics. My impression is that private politics is a compliment rather than a
substitute for public policies. In fact, governmental policies regarding issues
such as emission quotas, humanitarian aid, international trade and interna-
tional conflicts has never been as influenced by NGOs as it is today. Private
politics is most important in situations with weak governments and strong
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corporations. In most of the western world you have strong corporations,
but you also have strong governments. In the presence of governments with
the power to implement and maintain laws, public policies will be more im-
portant and the need for private politics correspondingly less important.
The model I present in Chapter 3 has several similarities to the private
politics literature of Baron and Diermeier. In both frameworks is there com-
petition between conflicting parties over public sentiment, and in both cases
does the media play an important role (see 2.5). There are however some
essential differences. In the private politics game is the conflict of interest
between an NGO and a private firm, while in my model on NGOs’ impact on
public policies (see Chapter3) is the conflict between two competing NGOs
and an incumbent politician with preferences for the status quo policy.
2.5 Media bias
2.5.1 A technological news bias
The role of the mass media as a supplier of information has over the past few
years been recognized in political economy as having impact on public poli-
tics (Swinnen and Francken, 2006) [31]. Stro¨mberg (2002, 2004) emphasizes
that if better informed voters receive favorable policies, then the mass media
has policy influence since they provide voters with most of the information
they use in voting11 [30][29]. According to Stro¨mberg is the media motivated
by profits and hence concerned about maximizing sales and advertising rev-
11See section 2.3 for discussion on asymmetries in information between groups of voters
and its impact on public policy.
28
enues12. In a formal model he shows that profit motivation combined with
increasing returns to scale technology in news distribution, makes the media
bias it news provision toward the interests of large groups and groups that are
valuable to advertisers. This news bias in news provision eventually trans-
lates into a bias in public policies, where large groups, e.g. consumers and
tax-payers, and groups valuable to advertisers, e.g young and rich, receives
favorable policies due to their informational advantage.
An interesting theoretical prediction from Stro¨mberg’s paper is that the
presence of a profit maximizing media contradicts the theoretical prediction
of Olson (1965) [29][25]. Olson’s theory says that the collective action prob-
lem is increasing with group size, which gives the perverted result that the
minority will dominate the majority. A famous empirical verification of his
theory is the broad appearance of tariffs on imported goods. Such a tar-
iff gains the small group of homeland producers with concentrated benefits,
and hurts the large but dispersed group of homeland consumers with dif-
fuse costs. The producers’ threshold to solve the collective action problem is
relatively small, so they will be able to organize and lobby the government
for tariffs. The large group of consumers however has strong incentives to
free-ride on each other and subsequently fail to solve the collective action
problem. Since no single consumer have strong enough incentives, or the
resources, to lobby the government on their own, the preferences for low con-
sumer prices are not lobbied on the government resulting in a policy that
benefit the few. Stro¨mberg predicts that the presence of a profit maximiz-
12In Europe there has been a tradition for governmentally controlled tv and radio, and
newspapers aligned with political parties. This has however changed considerably over
the last years, and today the assumption of a profit maximizing media with exclusively
commercial interests is a plausible assumption [31].
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ing media will counter this bias since it has incentives to provide information
that is of interest to as large groups of readers as possible, such as consumers.
Better informed voters receive more precise signals on political decisions and
are therefor more responsive to politicians’ actions, and consequently more
powerful. It is exactly this mechanism that translates the news bias into a
public policy bias.
2.5.2 Three hypothesizes about the media
Swinnen and Francken (2006) test three hypothesizes about the media [31].
Their results are based on the coverage of trade policy and globalization from
three leading Belgian media organizations over the period from 1999-2002.
The first hypothesis they test is referred to as the ’bad news hypothesis’.
This hypothesis is verified in their data set as they find that negative news
dominate positive news regarding trade and globalization. McCluskey and
Swinnen (2004) make a theoretical argumentation for this hypothesis claim-
ing it is the customers that have a higher demand for negative news rather
than any inherent preference of the media [20]. Assume that there are two
types of stories ’good news’ and ’bad news’. ’Good news’ give information
to customers about people that make good decisions. The customer can
in turn learn from and replicate the good news to increase its own utility.
’Bad news’ on the other hand informs customers about people making wrong
choices, which the customer in turn can avoid making herself. Assuming risk
averse preferences and using Jensen’s inequality, it is possible to show that
the reader will have a higher expected utility from additional information
on an issue with negative welfare effects, than from an issue that enhances
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welfare. Thus the reader will demand news with a negative slant providing
her with warnings.
Swinnen and Francken’s second hypothesis claims that in heterogenous
populations, different media organizations will emerge and have different
coverage of news concerning trade and globalization. Their data set which
contains the number of articles on globalization and trade summits over the
period 1999-2002 shows strong evidence that the ’elite’ newspaper had a
much broader representation of international issues than the tabloid press1314.
While the Belgian quality press devoted much attention to each summit, the
popular press paid in general little and biased attention to the international
summits. The Genoa summit, which was characterized by massive demon-
strations and violence, received two thirds of their total summit coverage,
while the Doha summit was not mentioned15.
The third hypothesis that Swinnen and Francken test is whether news
coverage on globalization would be concentrated around specific ’events’, and
whether this concentration would be stronger in the popular press and in-
creasing in media competition. They investigated this hypothesis by dividing
coverage of globalization into three subgroups. One, information about the
summit itself, two, background info on globalization, and three, information
on demonstrations and violence. The results of the classification underscored
their expectations, and showed that the the quality press had an approxi-
13The summits were respectively in Seattle, Genoa, Doha and Johannesburg
14By ’elite’ newspaper Swinnen and Francken refer to the press that targets what they
call the skilled part of the population. With ’popular’ newspaper they refer to the press
that targets the ’low-skilled’ audience.
15One should notice however that -although less extreme- the ’quality’ newspaper did
also have a clear bias in their news representation of the Genoa summit relative to the
Doha summit. Their coverage shares were respectively 38- and 17 percent.
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mately equal distribution of attention to each of the categories, while the
popular press devoted three fourths of its attention to demonstrations and
violence, and almost none to background info on globalization. Regression
analysis showed a significant positive correlation between the amount of me-
dia coverage and ’riots and demonstrations’ related to globalization. This
relationship was positive for all types of media, and for the popular press
the coverage seemed to grow exponentially above a certain level of riots and
violence.
Theories of media coverage is important for NGOs since their success in
influencing policy is dependent on whether the media choose to give them
attention or not. Based on Stro¨mberg’s results it follows directly that NGOs
should focus on issues that have broad public interest if they are to align
their own policy preferences with the preference for sales in the media. Ad-
vertising is an alternative way of getting media coverage, which does not rely
on the decision of the media whether or not to present the NGOs’ cause.
However, most NGOs have relatively small resources, and advertising is con-
sequently not within their feasible strategy set of ways to enforce pressure on
the politician. Swinnen and Francken’s support of the ’bad news hypothesis’
from the Belgian media coverage of trade and globalization, indicate that
the NGO would be most successful using political pressure if it emphasizes
the negative consequences related to the alternative policy. Their findings
indicate further that the media reacts to ’noise’ which implies that NGOs
should focus on making demonstrations and riots in the context of specific
events16.
16One could however imagine that media coverage may have adverse effect on the NGO
cause if their demonstrations attract undesired elements who practice violence or other
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2.5.3 An internal news bias
In contrast to the aforementioned papers Baron (2004) has a supply side
explanation of news bias in the media, arguing it is a reflection of the jour-
nalists’ preferences [2]. This model is in line with the common perception
that journalists, on average, are politically orientated to the left. The pop-
ulist right wing party Fremskrittspartiet, which was the 2nd largest party
in Norway at the 2005 national election, has complained that the coverage
of their politics has been negatively biased compared to the media coverage
of other political parties. Annual surveys initiated by ’Mediedagene’ have
shown that few, if any, journalists actually vote for Fremskrittspartiet. So
when Fremskrittspartiet feels discriminated in the media it is probably a just
complaint?
2.5.4 A demand news bias
Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) claim that people have bias toward news
that fit with their already existing believes17 [24]. Given this assumption
their theoretical results predicts that increased competition within the me-
dia will only contribute towards a stronger slanting of news. However if the
economy is populated with heterogenous people with different bias in be-
lieves, then different news organizations will serve different segments of the
population, and the whole truth will be available from the aggregated media
criminal activities. This may make the NGO consider large street demonstrations as more
risky and undesirable relative to other types of political activities. However to make things
simple we will ignore this consideration here.
17A idea very similar to that of Anthony Downs in his book ’An economic theory of
democracy’ (1957).
33
representation.
2.6 Informational cascades
The theory of informational cascades is an economic theory about social
learning which explains rational herd behavior. This theory, which was in-
troduced by Bikhachandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), can potentially
provide us with an explanation of NGOs’ political impact due to their occa-
sional role as herd leader [1][7][9]. If an NGO’s private signal about the true
state on a specific issue is stronger than voters’ individual signal, then the
NGO’s political opinion may become the consensus among the voters and
subsequently influence politics18. In the following section I will explain the
concept of informational cascades using an example related to our daily life.
Imagine there are two neighboring coffee-shops - the coffee King and the
coffee Bean. The Bean serves better coffee, but this is not publicly known.
Specifically, before the customer receives any information he assumes that
the chances are fifty-fifty which shop serves the best coffee. However, each
individual facing the choice between the two coffee-shops receives a private
signal regarding which is the better coffee-shop of the King and the Bean.
When an individual receives for example the private signal ’King’ he updates
his believes such that the probability of ’King’ serving the best coffee is now
p > 1/219. In addition to the private signal individuals also observe which
18Actually, for the NGO to become herd leader it is sufficient that the private signal of
the NGO is perceived to be stronger than the individual voter’s signal.
19The probability p is then the posterior probability that King serves the best coffee,
conditioned on that the individual had received a private signal that the King served the
best coffee.
34
coffee-shop people before them have chosen to enter. This way there are two
signals: one private, and one public.
Consider Eirik who wakes up early one morning and feels for a cup of
morning coffee. He is the first customer to arrive at the scene of the two
competing neighboring coffee-shops so he has no predecessors to base his
choice on. However, the day before he overheard a conversation on the
subway where someone spoke favorably about ’King’. This private signal
updated his believes to p > 1/2 in favor of the ’King’, and so he decides to
order his coffee there. Only a few seconds later Mari comes to the neighbor-
ing coffee-shops where she sees Eirik in line at the ’King’. Mari is in doubt
where to find the best coffee. She had just received a tip from a friend of
hers about the coffee at the ’Bean’ and believed that the ’Bean’ was better
with probability p > 1/2, but when she saw that Eirik was already in line
at the ’King’ she knew that he must have received some private information
that contradicted the tip of her friend20. Mari has no reason to trust her own
private signal over Eirik’s, so in order to make up her mind she tosses a coin
to decide which shop to enter. Let us assume that the coin landed on heads
so that Mari decided to disregard her own private signal and instead get in
line behind Eirik at the ’King’.
When Magnus arrives as the third customer at the scene he sees that
Eirik and Mari are already in line at the ’King’. Although Magnus, like
Mari, has a private signal that says ’Bean’, he knows that the first one in
20Some might question why Mari dosen’t trust her friend’s tip over the information
signal she got from any random guy standing in line. Well, what this example does not
tell you is that Mari has had mixed results in the past when following her friend’s tips,
and that these experiences on average have showed out to have a probability p of being
good tips.
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line received private information that the ”King” was better. He also knows
that the second one in line either received a signal that the ”Bean” was
better, but tossed a coin and ended up at the ”King”, or alternatively, she
received the signal that ”King” was better and went in there just like Eirik
did. Anyway, Magnus knows that it is more likely that Mari observed ’King’
than ’Bean’, and consequently is it rational for Magnus to disregard his own
private signal and get in line at the ’King’ behind the others. Magnus, as
well as all succeeding customers for the rest of the day, are now locked in an
informational cascade. No new private information will be revealed, because
the public signal is stronger than each individual’s private signal. After Mari
by chance landed on the ’King’ it is rational for each individual to ignore
its own private signal and get in line behind the others at the King. All the
people entering the shops for the rest of the day face the same decision based
on the same information basis as Magnus just did, and so they all end up
buying their coffee at the ’King’.
The probability of an efficient equilibrium is of course higher than the
probability of an inefficient one. It may take many rounds before an infor-
mational cascade occurs, but when it happens it is more likely to be at the
efficient equilibrium. NGOs are often regarded as experts within their field
of interest, and are hence likely to play the role referred to in the literature
as ’fashion leader’ [7] [8]. Experts receives more precise information signal
than others, and are therefore more capable of making good decisions inde-
pendently of others. A strong private signal reduce the incentives to copy
other’s actions, and increase the incentive to act independently of others.
Since some NGOs are regarded as expert organizations it can give them an
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influential role as agenda setters. When issues are complex and information
is costly to acquire, there is a strong incentive to free-ride on the information
of others. Imagine that an NGO which is publicly perceived as an expert
organization goes to the media with a policy proposal on a certain issue. If
the NGOs’ private information signal is perceived to be sufficiently strong,
it will be rational for all succeeding people to agree with the NGO in lack of
any other information. This will make the NGO ’herd leader’, and create a
political consensus in accordance with what the NGO says.
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Chapter 3
The game
NGOs target politicians because politicians have the power to implement
public policies desired by the NGO. However, for an incumbent politician to
comply to the NGO’s policy demands it is decisive that the NGO is perceived
as legitimate. In a democracy, legitimacy means that you represent the
public, in this model represented by the median voter1. Within democracies
there is a clear tendency that competing political parties converge toward the
same policies. The political platform differs between democracies because
the median voter have different preferences in different countries. Political
candidates care for reelection but are also citizens with their own individual
preferred policies. One can therefore make the realistic assumption that
politicians have both partisan and opportunistic preferences.
Imagine a political party that goes to election with a portfolio of specific
1Mueller (1989) states: ’if θ is a single-dimensional issue, and all voters have single-
peaked preferences defined over θ, then θm, the median position, cannot lose under ma-
jority rule’ [23]. Although θ may have multiple dimension in our model, we assume that
these dimensions can be mapped into a single dimension on which voters have single-peaked
preferences.
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policy proposals in their party programme. During an election campaign
there are some issues that are debated, while others are not given any atten-
tion at all. For voters to get an impression of a party’s politics it is important
that the policies that are debated during the election campaign can be re-
lated to voters’ individual experiences. An issue is considered complex when
it has many dimensions and hence no clear cut answer to it. That is, when an
issue is complex, the private signals are weak and the voters are not conscious
about their own preferred policies. My statement goes as follows: the more
complex an issue is, the less likely it is that it will be a ’high profile’ issue
during the election campaign. This is because the politician’s stand on such
an issue does not give the voter any information whether or not it should sup-
port the politician, and consequently are complex issues not interesting in an
electoral campaign. Taking this reasoning into account, politicians will only
align its policies with the median voters preferences if the issue has great risk
of being debated in the election. Complex issues are however rarely debated
during campaigns, leaving a scope for the politicians to implement their own
preferred policy on these issues. There are basically two reasons for this: the
first is the one mentioned above, the other is that the politician’s knowledge
about the median’s preferences is decreasing in an issue’s complexity. It is
therefore not only that the politician sees its chance to get its own policy
preferences implemented, it is also because the politician simply does not
know the median voter’s preferences, or the median voter simply does not
know its own preferences on the issue. Since the politician does not know the
preferences of the median, the best it can do is to suggest its own preferred
policy.
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As a point of departure let us assume that we deal with a complex issue
that has not been debated during the electoral campaign, but which has a
specific policy in the incumbent’s party programme. Given this situation we
want to analyze how the distribution of resources among the NGOs’ play a
role in their respective choice of strategy. Furthermore we want to investigate
how the distance of the NGOs preferred policy to that of the incumbent’s
party programme policy is decisive for the strategy choice of the NGO. Other
interesting parameters that will affect which strategy combination is an equi-
librium is the degree of complexity of the issue, as well as how interesting
the issue is to the public.
3.1 Political pressure versus informational lob-
bying
3.1.1 A formal model
Our economy is populated by two NGOs, NGO1 and NGO0, which have
diametrically extreme policy preferences. The policy θ is ∈ [0, 1], where
NGO1’s preferred policy is θp = 1, while NGO0 prefers θp = 0 (see figure
3.1). The party programme policy, θ′, is located somewhere on the policy
scale 3.1 dependent on the incumbent’s policy preferences.
Consistent with their aforementioned preferences, the NGOs’ utility func-
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Figure 3.1: Policy scale
tions are respectively
pi0 = 1− θp (3.1)
pi1 = θp (3.2)
were NGO0’s utility is a linearly decreasing function of the level of the party
programme policy θp, while NGO1’s utility is a linearly increasing function
of the same variable. Conflicting interests make the NGOs compete over
influence on public policy. Both NGOs can choose between informational
lobbying (I) or political pressure (P) as means to make the incumbent sway
the policy in their preferred direction.
The NGOs’ budgets are given by the function
I1 ≤ αI (3.3)
I0 ≤ (1− α)I (3.4)
where I0 + I1 = I, which is the total amount of resources available to the
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NGOs. I1 − I0 = (2α− 1) is a measure of the relative resource power of the
competing NGOs, where I is normalized to one. By assumption NGO1 has
more access to resources than NGO0. This means that we only look at values
of 1
2
≤ α < 1. The more funds available, the more informational lobbying
can the NGO buy. Similar to the standard model of costly lobbying the
likeliness that the NGO will get a favorable response by the political decision-
maker increase with the NGO’s investment in informational lobbying [16].
Investment in lobbying influences the politician according to the following
function:
g(α, θ′) = (I1 − I0)(1− θ′)θ′
=

(2α− 1)(1− θ′)θ′ if LL
−(1− α)(1− θ′)θ′ if LP
α(1− θ′)θ′ if PL
0 if PP
(3.5)
If both NGOs choose informational lobbying then NGO1 will win since it
has more resources to utilize on convincing arguments ( 2α − 1 > 0). If
for example NGO0 choose informational lobbying and NGO1 choose politi-
cal pressure then NGO0 will have monopoly on informational lobbying and
NGO1 must abstain from using its available resources. The impact infor-
mational lobbying has on policy is dependent on the deviation of the party
programme policy from the NGOs preferred policy (see figure 3.2). We see
from figure 3.2 that the policy’s responsiveness to informational lobbying is
symmetric around θ′ = 1
2
, and that for values of θ′ < 1
2
the policy’s respon-
siveness is an increasing function of θ′, while for θ′ > 1
2
the responsiveness is
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Figure 3.2: Responsiveness of policy as a function of informational lobbying
for α = 0.8 given LL
decreasing in θ′. The intuition is as following: when the interest of conflict
between the incumbent and the NGO is large, the incumbent is reluctant
to change its point of view from informational lobbying. As the conflict of
interest decreases the incumbent gradually becomes more sensitive to the
NGO’s arguments. That informational lobbying is most effective on policy
when the incumbent has policy preferences in the middle of the policy scale
is a credible assumption, since the politician in this situation is indifferent
between which way it moves. Political candidates that have policy prefer-
ences similar to that of the NGO will be increasingly reluctant to the NGO’s
argument since it means moving in a more extreme policy direction.
The NGOs must decide whether to specialize in informational lobbying
or political pressure. If the NGO choose to perform political pressure it will
receive media coverage according to the function
ci = s(θi − θ′)2 (3.6)
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| ∆θi | measures NGOi’s preferred policy’s distance from the party pro-
gramme policy, θ′. The amount of media coverage, ci, which NGOi receives
from the media, is assumed to be an exponentially increasing function of this
distance. This implies that the NGO with the largest conflict of interest with
the incumbent will have a better chance of success in political pressure. The
basis for such a functional relationship is the propensity towards ’bad news’
in the media. The parameter s describes to which degree the issue at hand
is of interest to the public. Issues of little interest to the public will have dif-
ficulties getting substantial media coverage. Political pressure is a powerful
tool since it under the right circumstances can give the NGO influence on
the median voter’s preferred policy. In other words, the median voter’s pre-
ferred policy is endogenously determined. The impact on the median voter’s
preferred policy is dependent on the equilibrium strategy combination
∆θ¯ = x(c1 − c2)
=

sx(1− 2θ′) if PP
sx(1− θ′)2 if LP
−sxθ′2 if PL
0 if LL
(3.7)
∆θ¯ is the median voter’s policy response to the public media signal. As we
see, the responsiveness of the median voter’s preferred policy is a function
of the public interest, s, the distance of the NGOs preferred policy to the
party programme policy,| ∆θi |, and the complexity of the issue x. x ∈ [0, 1]
is a parameter increasing with the issues complexity. The more complex the
issue the weaker are voters’ private information signals. Weak private signals
44
increase the probability that the NGO can start an informational cascade via
the media. If none of the NGOs decide to use political pressure there will
be no attention given to the party programme policy, and the median voter
does not move.
The incumbent has, as mentioned before, both opportunistic and partisan
preferences. On one hand it cares about the policies stated in its party pro-
gramme and convincing arguments supplied through informational lobbying.
On the other hand it wants to be reelected. Whichever way the median voter
moves the incumbent has incentives to follow. The incumbent’s preferences
can be expressed as a loss function which it wants to minimize with respect
to its final policy decision θp.
L = (1− s)(θp − θ′ − g(α, θ′))2 + s(θp − θ′ −∆θ¯)2 (3.8)
The first expression, weighted with 1 − s, tells us that its painful for the
incumbent to let the final policy θp deviate from the party programme policy
θ′ and the convincing arguments it receives through informational lobbying
g(α, θ′). The fact that the party programme policy and the response function
to informational lobbying is put together can be interpreted as if informa-
tional lobbying has the power to change the ideology of the incumbent. The
second expression, weighted with s, states that it is painful for the incum-
bent to deviate from the movement of median voters preferred policy. This is
due to the risk of not being reelected. The parameter s indicates the degree
of public interest on the specific issue. If the public interest on the issue is
large, then this issue may be pivotal in the next election, and hence does
the incumbent emphasize the importance of not deviating from the median
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voter’s preferred policy. This means that political pressure will be effective
relative to informational lobbying when the public interest concerning the
issue is large.
To find the incumbent’s policy function we minimize the loss function
with respect to θp. What the optimal policy function will be is dependent
on which strategy combination is chosen by the NGOs in equilibrium. We
will therefore get four different first order conditions, and correspondingly
four policy functions. The respective policy function is the incumbent’s best
reply to the given combination of strategies.
The first order conditions are found by minimizing the incumbent’s loss
function (equation 3.8) subject to political pressure’s influence on the me-
dian voter (equation 3.7)) and the informational lobbying function (equation
3.5). Solving these four minimization problem we get the following policy
functions:
θp(LL) = θ
′ + (1− s)(2α− 1)(1− θ′)θ′ (3.9)
θp(LP ) = θ
′ − (1− s)(1− α)(1− θ′)θ′ + s2x(1− θ′)2 (3.10)
θp(PL) = θ
′ + (1− s)α(1− θ′)θ′ − s2xθ′2 (3.11)
θp(PP ) = θ
′ + s2x(1− 2θ′) (3.12)
The policy functions are the incumbent’s best response to any strategy com-
bination of the NGOs2. Since the NGOs know the incumbent’s utility func-
tion, they also know the incumbent’s policy function. The NGOs’ utilities
are functions of the final policy. The incumbent’s policy function is therefore
2All the second order conditions are strictly positive so we know that the policy func-
tions are global optimums to the incumbent’s loss function.
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a basis for finding the respective NGO’s optimal strategy choice given the
choice of its competitor.
3.1.2 Static one-period game
The timing in the model is as follows: 1) a party programme policy θ′ is
picked by nature corresponding to the incumbent’s individual preferences,
2) both NGOs decide whether to spend money on information lobbying or
to use political pressure. 3) The incumbent takes the NGOs’ actions into
account and decides the final level of the public policy θp. An illustration of
the game is given in figure 3.3
Figure 3.3: The game
Given the incumbent’s policy rule, the NGOs simultaneously choose whether
to use informational lobbying (L) or political pressure (P )3. By applying the
3The strategy decisions must not actually be taken simultaneously. It is sufficient that
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method of iterated elimination of dominated strategies we find the equilib-
rium where each NGO’s strategy choice is the best response to the others
strategy. This is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if none of the players have incen-
tives to unilaterally deviate from their chosen strategy. Formally we say that
each of the NGOs can choose a strategy s which is part of the strategy set,
S ∈ [L, P ].
To use the method of iterated elimination we need first to calculate the
payoffs for the four pairs of strategy combinations that we have. The NGOs’
payoffs are calculated by inserting the correct policy function (3.9-3.12) into
the utility function of the respective agent (3.2 and 3.1). The NGOs’ payoffs
for different strategy combinations for the static Lobby-Pressure-game are
presented in table 3.1.
3.1.3 Finding the dominant strategy
In order to find the equilibrium we use iterated elimination of dominated
strategies, which gives us four pairs of incentive constraints. This is done by
comparing deviation payoffs with payoffs from staying for both players (see
table 3.2 for a normal for representation). If the incentive constraint for both
NGOs are simultaneously fulfilled, then the strategy combination is a Nash
equilibrium.
the NGO’s decision is made without knowledge of the other NGO’s decision.
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Table 3.1: Payoffs
Player Strategy combination Payoff
0 L,L pi0LL = 1− θ′ − (1− s)(2α− 1)(1− θ′)θ′
1 L,L pi1LL = θ
′ + (1− s)(2α− 1)(1− θ′)θ′
0 L, P pi0LP = 1− θ′ + (1− s)(1− α)(1− θ′)θ′ − s2x(1− θ′)2
1 L, P pi1LP = θ
′ − (1− s)(1− α)(1− θ′)θ′ + s2x(1− θ′)2
0 P,L pi0PL = 1− θ′ − (1− s)α(1− θ′)θ′ + s2xθ′2
1 P,L pi1PL = θ
′ + (1− s)α(1− θ′)θ′ − s2xθ′2
0 P, P pi0PP = 1− θ′ − s2x(1− 2θ′)
1 P, P pi1PP = θ
′ + s2x(1− 2θ′)
Table 3.2: Payoff matrix
NGO0
L P
NGO1 L pi
0
LL,pi
1
LL pi
0
PL,pi
1
PL
P pi0LP ,pi
1
LP pi
0
PP ,pi
1
PP
Incentive constraints for equilibrium LL
pi0LL > pi
0
PL
(1− s)(1− α)(1− θ′)θ′ > s2xθ′2 (3.13)
pi1LL > pi
1
LP
(1− s)α(1− θ′)θ′ > s2x(1− θ′)2 (3.14)
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Incentive constraints for equilibrium LP
pi0LP > pi
0
PP
(1− s)(1− α)(1− θ′)θ′ > s2xθ′2 (3.15)
pi1LP > pi
1
LL
s2x(1− θ′)2 > (1− s)α(1− θ′)θ′ (3.16)
Incentive constraints for equilibrium PL
pi0PL > pi
0
LL
s2xθ′2 > (1− s)(1− α)(1− θ′)θ′ (3.17)
pi1PL > pi
1
PP
(1− s)α(1− θ′)θ′ > s2x(1− θ′)2 (3.18)
Incentive constraints for equilibrium PP
pi0PP > pi
0
LP
s2xθ′2 > (1− s)(1− α)(1− θ′)θ′ (3.19)
pi1PP > pi
1
PL
s2x(1− θ′)2 > (1− s)α(1− θ′)θ′ (3.20)
50
3.1.4 Characterization of equilibrium
I will now present the different equilibrium strategy combinations and the
changes in the final policy’s deviation from the party programme policy as I
vary strategic parameters.
s=0.1 while x=0.7
We start of finding the equilibrium combinations for an issue which is of little
public interest but relatively complex, s=0.1, and x = 0.7. From figure 3.4
we see that when the public interest is small, s=0.1, LL is the equilibrium
strategy combination independently of relative wealth, α, or level of party
programme policy, θ′4. LL is the only equilibrium when the public interest
Figure 3.4: Equilibrium s=0.1, x=0.7
4This is seen from figure 3.4 by observing that all cells are ’colored’ white.
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Figure 3.5: s=0.1,x=0.7,α=0.9,θ′=0.5 Figure 3.6: s=0.1,x=0.7,α=0.9,θ′=0.1
is small, partly because the media is not interested in giving the NGOs any
coverage, and partly because the incumbent does not emphasize the median
voter’s preferred policy. From figure 3.4 we see that all cell values are positive
regardless of which value θ′ takes on, which means that the final policy is
moved in the direction of NGO1’s preferred policy. This result arise from
the fact that both NGOs apply informational lobbying in equilibrium and the
assumption that NGO1 is richer than NGO0 (α >
1
2
). From figure 3.5 and
3.6 we see that the impact on policy for NGO1 is largest for middle values
of θ′. This is due to the shape of the response function of informational
lobbying (see figure 3.2).
s=0.3 while x=0.7
Increasing the public interest from s=0.1 to s=0.3, and holding x fixed, we se
from figure 3.7 that there are now three types of equilibrium strategy combi-
nations, PL, LL and LP . Which strategy combination is the equilibrium one
depends on the values of θ′ and α. For low values of θ′ and α, NGO1 prefers
political pressure, while for high values of θ′ and all values α, NGO0 prefers
political pressure5. This tells us that even if the party programme policy,
5This is seen from figure 3.7 by observing that for low values of θ′ and α, the cells are
colored red, while for high values of θ′ and α the cells are colored green. Negative cell
values imply that the final policy level is moved in the preferred direction of NGO0.
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Figure 3.7: Equilibrium: s=0.3, x=0.7
θ′, takes on extreme values, it may be optimal for NGOs to choose political
pressure if the public interest is relatively low. However we see from figure
3.7 that access to resources is still decisive for the final policy level, and that
NGO1 will move the final policy in its preferred direction for approximately
all values of θ′ and α. NGO0’s propensity to use political pressure increase
as its resource endowments deteriorates with increasing values of α from left
to right in figure 3.7. Only when θ′ is close to NGO1’s preferred policy, and
the resources are not too skewed distributed, will NGO0 manage to move
the final policy in its preferred direction6. However, LL is still, as in figure
3.4, the dominating equilibrium strategy combination. This is because the
policy response to political pressure is low when the public interest is low.
6this can be seen from the negative cell-values on from the top of figure 3.7.
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s=0.5 while x=0.7
Setting s = 1
2
, while still holding x fixed, we observe from figure 3.8 that
the picture changes dramatically. All four strategy combinations are now
represented as equilibriums, and PL has become the dominating equilibrium
strategy combination. From figure 3.8 we see that NGO0 use political pres-
Figure 3.8: Equilibrium: s=0.5, x=0.7
sure even for low values of the programme policy θ′, and increasingly so as its
total share of resources decrease as α increases from left to right in figure 3.8.
When α=0.9, we observe from figure 3.8 that NGO0 prefers political pressure
for such low values of θ′ as 1
4
. The most interesting implication is, however,
found in the top corner of figure 3.8. Here we find the surprising theoretical
prediction that even though NGO1’s access to resources is superior to that
of NGO0 (α close to one), NGO0 manages to push the final policy in its
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preferred direction (see figure 3.9 for an illustration). The intuition behind
this result is that although the public interest is in the middle range, the
media considers the conflict of interest between the incumbent and NGO0 as
sensational bad news. NGO0’s policy stand is consequently provided with
sufficiently media coverage so that it affects the median voter’s preferred pol-
icy, which in turn induce the incumbent to change the final policy decision
in favor of NGO1. The realistic assumption that informational lobbying is
less effective when the programme policy and the NGO’s preferred policy
are already very similar contributes to the surprising result (see figure 3.2).
The result from figure 3.9 is interesting since it implies that in a world where
Figure 3.9: s=0.5, x=0.7, α = 0.9
the media is present and the public interest on the issue is relatively high,
NGOs’ impact on policy will be larger the larger the interest of conflict be-
tween the incumbent politician and the NGO. This result contradicts Potters
and van Winden’s (1992) theoretical prediction that the favorable response
of decision-makers is decreasing with the conflict of interest. The reason that
they get a different result is that they do not incorporate the media into their
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theory. If we go back to figure 3.4 we see that our results resembles Potters
and van Winden’s when the public interest of the issue is low, which is that
policy impact increase with resources spend on lobbying.
s=0.6 while x=0.7
When turning s up an additional notch, we see from figure 3.10 that LL is no
longer an equilibrium strategy combination. From figure 3.10 we se that the
absolute policy changes are almost symmetric on both sides of θ′ = 1
2
. This
implies that access to resources plays a decreasing role for the policy out-
come. Although NGO1 has considerably more resource power than NGO0,
it does not give NGO1 any significant advantage when it comes to influenc-
ing the final policy. Due to the functional form of the influence of political
pressure, we see from figure 3.10 that the distance between the final policy
and the party programme policy is larger the stronger the conflict of interest
between the NGO and the incumbent (for a specific example compare figure
3.11 and 3.12). Although the relative endowment of resources plays a de-
creasing role in the competition between the NGOs as we increase the public
interest, α still has influence on which strategy combination is preferred in
equilibrium. From 3.10 we observe that as α increases from left to right,
NGO1 gradually prefers informational lobbying to political pressure for de-
creasingly low values of θ′. Similarly, as we move from left to right in figure
3.10 for increasing values of α, we observe that NGO0’s propensity to use
political pressure relative to informational lobbying gradually increases for
lower values of θ′ . This observation from figure 3.10 implies that a change in
NGOs’ relative resources endowment, has a stronger effect on the preferred
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Figure 3.10: Equilibrium s=0.6, x=0.7
equilibrium strategy combination, than a correspondingly change in the party
programme policy. From figure 3.10 we recognize the same interesting result
as in 3.8 that the policy may move in favor of NGO0, even though NGO1 has
the lion’s share of the available resources. From figure 3.11 we see that the
result is even more prominent than in figure 3.9. In fact, the policy change
is in favor of NGO0 for all values of θ
′ > 0.55.
Figure 3.11:
s=0.6,x=0.7,α=0.9,θ′=0.9
Figure 3.12:
s=0.6,x=0.7,α=0.9,θ′=0.5
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s ∈[0.7-1.0] while x=0.7
As we continue to increase the public interest s we see from figure 3.13-
3.16, that the strategy combination PP becomes increasingly dominant for
all values of θ′ and α. When s = 0.9, there are no longer any equilibrium
combinations that gives NGO1 a comparative advantage of being richer than
NGO0. When s = 1 the incumbent will put zero weight on informational
lobbying, and hence will both NGOs exclusively use political pressure in
equilibrium.
Figure 3.13: Equilibrium s=0.7, x=0.7
x=0 while s=0.7
We now want to investigate the equilibrium strategy combinations and the
effects on the final policy level as we vary the complexity of the issue, while
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Figure 3.14: Equilibrium s=0.8, x=0.7
Figure 3.15: Equilibrium s=0.9, x=0.7
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Figure 3.16: Equilibrium s=1,0, x=0.7
holding the public interest fixed at a relatively high level. We start of finding
the equilibrium combinations for an issue which is simple and has a broad
public interest, s=0.7 and x=0. From figure 3.17 we observe that LL is the
equilibrium strategy combination for all values of θ′ and α. Political pressure
is not an equilibrium strategy because when the issue is simple, individuals
receive strong private signals from their daily life about the outcome of poli-
cies, and hence is there no scope to change policy preferences of the median
voter via political pressure. From figure 3.17 we see that all changes in pol-
icy are in favor of NGO1. Due to NGO1’s resource advantage, it will always
come out on top when both NGOs use informational lobbying in equilib-
rium. However the impact on policy is small, with the largest change being
(θp − θ′)=0.06. A high level of public interest makes the incumbent empha-
60
Figure 3.17: Equilibrium s=0,7, x=0
size the voter’s preferences, which makes the policy function correspondingly
less responsive to informational lobbying. Consequently, when the issue is
of public interest and not complex, will NGOs’ have little impact on public
policy.
x=0.5 while s=0.7
When we increase the complexity to x = 0.5, while still holding the pub-
lic interest fixed at s = 0.7, we see from figure 3.18 that the equilibrium
combinations are relatively equally distributed between PL, PP and LP for
different values of θ′ and α. There are no LL equilibriums. This situation
is very similar to that of s = 0.7, x = 0.7 in figure 3.13. Again we find
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Figure 3.18: Equilibrium s=0,7, x=0.5
Figure 3.19: s=0,7, x=0.5,α=0.9
the interesting implication that for high values of θ′ can the policy rule’s re-
sponsiveness to political pressure outweigh NGO1’s upper hand with respect
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to resources. Even if NGO1 would have 90 percent of the total resources
(α=0.9) NGO0 can gain a net favorable policy movement if the programme
policy is sufficiently remote from NGO0’s policy stand (see figure 3.19).
x=1 while s=0.7
The last situation we want to look at is the scenario of an extremely complex
issue with broad public public interest. The results are depicted in figure
3.20, were we see that the tendency from figure 3.18 continues as the number
of cells were PP is the equilibrium strategy becomes dominant.
Figure 3.20: Equilibrium s=0,7, x=1.0
Given a more complex issue, everything else equal, it becomes more ef-
fective to apply political pressure since the probability of starting an infor-
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Figure 3.21: s=0.7,x=1,α=0.9,θ′=0.9 Figure 3.22: s=0.7,x=1,α=0.9,θ′=0.5
mational cascade becomes large. When x=1, voters have basically no private
information, and consequently their preferred policy will be very responsive
to any signal from the media. We see that for high- and low values of θ′, the
median voter’s preferred policy will be carried a far distance on the policy
scale (see figure 3.21). From figure 3.20 we see that when the party pro-
gramme policy is in the middle range around 1
2
, both NGOs apply political
pressure which result in that their efforts to change the public policy cancel
each other out, leaving the median voter’s preferred policy unchanged (for
an illustration see figure 3.22). Due to the effectiveness of political pressure,
the skewed distribution of wealth does not give NGO1 any advantage in in-
fluencing the final policy level. To summarize, when x=1, the informational
cascade effect is very strong, and can carry the median voter a long distance
from its initially preferred policy. Given that the public interest is large, this
in turn leads to a large shift in policy from the incumbent.
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Chapter 4
Discussion
NGOs are characterized by working for their members’ common interest out-
side formal political institutions. NGOs are a heterogenous group and there
are no limits to the activities they might perform. However, one important
feature is that they are non-profit and that their funding is provided by
private donations, public funds or a mixture of the two. The focus of this
thesis has been on advocacy NGOs and how they strategically use informa-
tional lobbying or political pressure to achieve impact on political decision
processes.
NGOs and politics is a controversial combination. Critics claim that
NGOs’ increased political influence is undemocratic and diminishes welfare.
Supporters emphasize that NGOs, and lobbying in general, is a positive
complement to the electoral process, and that it contributes to bring out the
preference intensity of voters [6].
The model developed in this thesis gives several predictions regarding
why, how and which NGOs gain political influence. One of them is that the
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largest policy responses are likely to be observed on complex issues of large
public interest. If the conflict of interest between the incumbent and the NGO
under these circumstances is large, then the NGO can start an informational
cascade via the media, which consequently pressures the incumbent to change
its policy significantly. We do not however expect to see much NGO impact
on policy in situations where we have a non-complex issue of large public
interest. In this situation the incumbent will emphasize the median voter at
the same time as there is no scope for the NGO to start an informational
cascade.
The model also gives predictions related to the distribution of resources
between competing NGOs. Given a situation where we have an issue of little
public interest, the model’s prediction is in line with the conventional theory
that the NGO with the most resources will gain policy influence. However,
in situations where the specific issue is complex and of large or moderate
public interest, the distribution of resources will be of little, if any, relevance
for the final policy. In fact, the model predicts that a poor NGO can win
the competition over policy if its interest of conflict with the incumbent is
sufficiently strong.
The theory introduced in this thesis remains to be systematically tested.
The model in chapter 3 is primarily intended as a crude point of departure
for further research. Several extensions could however contribute to add ad-
ditional realism into the model framework. Although I have assumed that
NGOs either use informational lobbying or political pressure, in practice
NGOs often use both strategies. This implies that the two strategies might
be compliments rather than substitutes. By allowing NGOs to choose both
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strategies at the same time, it is likely that one would find some interesting
implications regarding the interaction between informational lobbying and
political pressure. Another realistic extension would be to introduce costs
of political pressure. In reality there are significant costs associated with
initiating demonstrations and managing the media, and a more realistic as-
sumption could be that the NGO would have to divide its resources between
informational lobbying and political pressure. A third extension would be to
introduce repeated games in the model. Most NGOs work to achieve long
term goals and meet political decision-makers regularly over time. A natural
extension would therefore be to allow for the game to be played over several
succeeding periods in order to see what happens to the policy over time.
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